Politically and militarily, Iraq is going through the worst period in its recent history. From a strategic perspective, this period offers an opportunity to implement fundamental changes in Iraq’s relations with the existing superpowers and with regional players while sustaining its vitality in the future. What makes this an urgent and immediate concern is the dramatic shifts which have lately shaped the regional political landscape.
These changes have been instigated by outside forces and have been in the making for several years. They have been enabled by regimes that seldom answer to their people and simply give lip service to their needs. This has made the region fertile soil for disruptive forces and for chaotic instability.
In an interview with Frontline (March 18, 2021), former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor and former Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, James Jeffery, gave rare insight into how the region’s affairs are managed not by its people but by countries far away. In his comments, Jeffery was frank and straightforward in his assessment of how events have been steered toward Washington’s political goals. In one of his telling stories on the logic behind Washington keeping communication channels open with Ahmed Al Shara (Al Ju lani) and his group, he asserted that policy makers had certain regional priorities that were often not discussed publicly. He appeared to suggest that Washington’s political elite cultivated Al Shara stating, “We haven’t targeted him ever, the fact is that we have never raised our voice to the Turks about their cohabitation with them.”
In the interview, Jeffery outlined certain strategic priorities and actions which eventually led to the collapse of the Syrian regime and to the rapid changes in regional realignments that further have strengthened Israeli supremacy. He outlined these actions into the following:
- Embolden Terrorists. Jeffery placed an emphasis on the role of the American prison in the South of Iraq, Camp Bucca. It was in that jail that Al Shara was kept and went through intensive training and indoctrination. According to Jeffery, Camp Bucca became a jihad university and“a breeding ground for taking people who were interested in jihad to becoming professionals in jihad. And we had no way of getting in and dealing with these people.”
- The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was thought of as a staging ground for remaking the Middle East according to Israel’s image. While many neoconservatives thought of using Iraq as a base for attacking Iran, Paul Wolfowitz and Dick Cheney thought to teach the rest of the countries a lesson that they would never forget. Jeffery asserted, “It was all about overthrowing a system and changing the Middle East by making people realize we were not screwing around anymore after 9/11, and you’d better behave or we’re coming after you… . . We’re going to go in; we’re going to totally scramble these countries.”
- Destroying Syria to advance a new security system in the Middle East. Jeffery was articulate on this point and thought that without incapacitating the Syrian regime the Abraham Accord would be impossible. Though he argued that preventing “a Russian-Assad-Iranian victory” was an intermediary goal, the end goal was to move forward to establish the new Middle East by underscoring the role of Syria in such a mega transformation. He argued that Syria“given its size, its strategic location, its historical importance, is the pivot point for whether an American-managed security system in the region, with now the — consider the Abraham Accords people, because that was, in a way, both encouraged by what we were doing in Syria and elsewhere.”
- Rebranding Violent Groups. Jeffery made a powerful argument that terrorist camps in Iraq and Syria range from moderates to extremists. His point is that Washington prefers to work with moderate groups. It is for this very reason, he specified, that Washington decided to rebrand Al Shara and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). He stated, “when there is not the normal setup of nation-states and of international norms and rules and behavior and international law, you wind up with groups like this, that do things you don’t like, that have a genealogy that is very troubling. But in the here-and-now are the folks you have to deal with to avoid even worse things.”
There are a few lessons from the recent past and from the downfall of Assad that responsible Iraqis must take note of. These are:
- The government must attend to the needs of its people. The speedy collapse of Assad has demonstrated that the discontent of the majority and the widespread mistrust of the government and its apparatus is a powerful factor in unseating the government.
- Iraq must improve its standard of living. Faced with economic sanctions led by Washington, the regime in Syria ignored those who could have been its loyal base. Thus, these marginalized segments were indifferent when extremist groups seized opportunities and controlled various major cities. Iraqi oil revenue is wasted. It should contribute to enhancing the wellbeing of ordinary citizens.
- Leaders should be transparent with their citizens, as informed and responsible citizens will defend their countries. This is where Assad failed in that he marginalized the public’s input. As invaders entered Syria, he was left without the support of the public. Leaders must not compromise on national priorities. During the era of the patriotic leader, Abdul Karim Qassim, right-wing groups were given opportunities to act freely, while activities of the progressive groups were curtailed. As the U.S. backed coup took place on Feb. 8, 1963, people went to the streets to defend the progressive regime against the plotters. Unfortunately, their protests were crushed within a few days, as right-wing groups were well organized and heavily armed.
- Leaders must have in their inner circles those who are courageous enough to speak the truth and provide sincere advice. Assad was surrounded by opportunists who only care about accumulating wealth. Having advisors who only bring good news is a recipe for disaster and is an indication that those in authority do not have the needed qualities to lead. Saddam filled his inner circle with individuals who feared him and told him what he wanted to hear.
- Laws and policies enacted immediately after the 1958 Revolution should be reinvigorated. These laws were designed to serve all Iraqis. They were driven by a spirit of patriotism. Today’s laws are incited by tribal or sectarian tendencies or dictated by the occupational authority, making them incapable of serving national interests.
- Bribery and corruption should be outlawed. In Syria, influential security and other government officers publicly humiliated citizens and failed to process anything without bribes. This significantly weakened the regime and made it easier for foreign entities to infiltrate the intelligence and military establishments. Those who are in authority in Iraq, if they care about their people, must act swiftly to distance themselves from those who put their immediate interests ahead of the country.
- Countries facing persistence threats from foreign powers and terrorism should prioritize their national and international alliances. The UAE and the Saudi Kingdom made their support for Syria contingent on Assad pulling Syria away from Iran and Lebanon. Assad was incapable of recognizing this trap, a fatal strategic mistake. He situated Syria in a weak position and made it vulnerable to terrorism. Those in power in Baghdad must identify friends and foes in their alliances to avoid the predictable fate of Syria. Since Iraq faces an existential threat from terrorism and foreign enemies, any call to dismantle the Popular Mobilization Forces at this time is intended to destroy the country. It amounts to treason.
- The dangers of foreign security training programs should be made aware of. Those in security and miliary establishments who participate in training programs in countries that do not wish Iraq well must not be involved in making strategic decisions or decisions related to foreign relations.
- Imports of military and intelligence equipment from countries that seek to destabilize Iraq should be limited. For example, military weapons that were bought from France malfunctioned during the 1991 and 2003 wars. Some weapons bought from western countries have secret electronic chips that can be activated at any time for adverse actions.
- Guidelines should be set for interacting with ambassadors from foreign powers. There are many religious and tribal Iraqi leaders who enjoy having meetings with these ambassadors. Cozy relationships are always problematic, especially where bonds have evolved into shared interests at the expense of Iraq’s national goals. It is during these meetings that indoctrination takes place.
- Procedures for recruiting and hiring officers in sensitive positions should be reevaluated. In many cities in Iraq, from Basrah to Erbil, foreign powers have established complex networks including individuals in sensitive positions, especially security. These networks are cells that could be activated to engage in disruptive events.
- The presence of foreign military needs to end. This presence is not only a risk to national security, but its existence further polarizes the political environment and deepens political and social fragmentation. The fear is that there are many people who have developed close working relations, if not blind loyalty, with these foreign forces. This constitutes a present danger.
The former U.S. diplomat and Special Representative for Syria Engagement made the above arguments two years before the defeat of the regime in Syria. Had Assad and his inner circle understood the message and the warning, the situation in Syria might have been different. Unfortunately, the regime was corrupted and made fatal mistakes in switching regional alliances just months before it collapsed. On domestic issues, mistakes were equally deadly as there were no attempts to tend to the needs of the people, rooted corruption, and increasing public mistrust.
While the above points are significant in safeguarding the future of Iraq, the shifting regional power dynamics constitute an immediate challenge. Considering how political events are unfolding and that the interplay among them is unpredictable, three interrelated factors are prerequisites for successful change: uprooting corruption, ending foreign military presence, and effectively fighting terrorism. The existence of each of these factors thrives on the presence of the other two. Confronting them is an imperative task. Without doing so, the future of a vital Iraq is questionable.
Abbas J. Ali is a distinguished university professor, Indiana University of Pennsylvania.